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Abstract
In frictional matching markets, buyers incur discrete inspection costs when assessing
the suitability of goods on oer, and sellers incur discrete `show' costs. This paper
studies how intermediaries can help reduce these costs. Intermediaries, whose value
derives from inventory, learning and memory, are shown to exist if goods are suciently
heterogeneous. Intermediaries may either be rms that buy goods and hold inventory
or brokers who search on behalf of their clients but do not buy or hold inventory. The
parameter space, in terms of the ratio of inspection to show costs, naturally separates
into two regions where rms exist versus where brokers exist.
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11 Introduction
In frictional matching markets, heterogenous buyers and sellers engage in costly search for
appropriate trading partners. As a stylized characterization, when a buyer and a seller
meet, the buyer incurs a discrete inspection cost to determine his valuation of the good,
and the seller likewise incurs a discrete `show' cost. During the inspection process, the
seller collects information about the buyer's preferences and the buyer nds out whether
the good on oer is suitable. If the good turns out not to be appropriate, the information
the buyer and the seller gathered during costly inspection adds no value to their future
search,1 although this information is often valued by other market participants. Therefore,
from a social perspective, there is insucient information generated and transmitted through
private search, which implies that there is room for intermediaries to emerge and internalize
this information externality.
Two types of intermediary, brokers and rms, are prevalent in frictional matching mar-
kets. Brokers, who work for a commission to connect buyers with sellers, actively seek clients
to represent and search on their behalf, without directly buying or selling goods. In real es-
tate, labor and securities markets, for instance, brokers are widespread and clearly play an
important role in reducing search frictions when facilitating trades. Dierent from brokers,
rms serving as intermediaries (henceforth just `rms') buy goods directly from sellers to
resell to buyers and prot from the spread between bid and ask prices. Although less visible
to the public, such rms also help reduce search frictions, particularly in industries where
producers have to nd customers for their new products. For example, in the pharmaceu-
tical industry, the most eective but costly form of marketing for a new prescription drug
is so-called `detailing,' which involves personal visits to a doctor by a sales representative
(Gagnon and Lexchin 2007; Mizik and Jacobson 2004). Many new drugs and treatments are
discovered in universities and small biotechnology rms, and these small producers typically
nd it too expensive to bring these drugs to market directly. Instead they form marketing
alliances with, or license their patents to, or sell the company/product to pharmaceutical
companies. The pharmaceutical companies then market the drug or treatment to doctors.
This paper studies how intermediaries, either as rms or brokers, can improve social
1This is the famous \no recall" theorem in the sequential search literature when the underlying distribution
is known; it does not apply if the underlying distribution is unknown (DeGroot 1970).
2welfare in search markets with heterogeneous market participants. Consider rst rms that
buy goods from sellers and resell them to buyers. For simplicity, suppose a rm can hold
at most two goods in its inventory. After the rm inspects a good in the sellers' market,
it learns the type of the good and which type of buyer the good will appeal to. After the
rm obtains two dierent types of good from the sellers' market, it will go to the buyers'
market to show the goods to buyers. When the rm incurs a show cost and a buyer incurs
an inspection cost to see the rst good on oer, the rm learns the buyer's type. If the
buyer buys the rst good, the transaction ends, while if the buyer rejects the rst good, the
rm learns about the buyer's preferences from the rst showing to determine whether it is
worthwhile to show additional goods from its inventory to the same buyer, thus economizing
on its show cost and the buyer's inspection cost. Firms will exist and improve social welfare
when there are many dierent types of goods in the market and the inspection cost exceeds
the show cost.2
The above reasoning also applies to brokers.3 Initially, these brokers have to search for
buyers. After learning the preferences of her clients, the broker will incur inspection costs to
search for goods on their behalf. When she nds a suitable good for one of her clients, the
seller of the good will incur the relevant show cost and the client will incur the inspection
cost to verify whether there is a match. The broker collects fees or commissions only when
her client nds the good appropriate. Therefore, she will not recommend unsuitable goods
to her clients, thus saving both inspection costs for her clients and show costs for the seller.
Brokers exist and improve social welfare when there is sucient heterogeneity in goods and
the show cost exceeds the inspection cost. Thus there is an endogenous division in the
parameter space relating to the existence of rms versus brokers.
We build on several large literatures. First, there is the literature on private search in
frictional matching markets (see a recent comprehensive survey by Rogerson, Shimer and
2The explanation as to why the inspection cost must exceed the show cost is as follows. The spread
between what a rm has to pay a seller and what it can charge a buyer has to cover the inspection and show
costs of the rm for eecting that transaction. The buyer can avoid paying the spread by approaching sellers
directly but will have to incur additional expected inspection costs. To a rst approximation, the increase
in the expected number of inspections is equal to the expected number of showings by the rm. So if the
inspection cost is less than the show cost, it is not worthwhile for buyers to deal with the rm.
3In this paper, we will deal primarily with buyers' brokers. At the end of the paper, we will point out
the dierence between buyers' and sellers' brokers and how our analysis can apply to the sellers' brokers.
3Wright 2005). Most of this literature deals with ow and delay costs of search rather than
discrete inspection or show costs. A notable exception is Atakan (2006), though he does not
study the role of intermediaries. The social ineciency of private search is well known, and
has generated a substantial literature on social learning.4 Our work is complementary to
this social learning literature.
The literature on search with intermediaries, starting with Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1987), focuses primarily on the role of intermediaries in reducing ow and delay costs.5 In
Rubinstein and Wolinsky, homogenous sellers with unit supply want to trade with homoge-
nous buyers with unit demand. Intermediaries also carry one unit of the good but can meet
customers faster than buyers can meet sellers directly. In a richer setting with heterogeneous
goods and tastes, Johri and Leach (2001) show that intermediaries can improve match qual-
ity and reduce delay costs if they can carry two units. An important paper by Shevchenko
(2004) endogenizes both the number of intermediaries and the size of inventory they carry
and characterizes the equilibrium price distribution.
All these papers assume that matching quality is freely revealed without inspection im-
mediately after market participants meet. In contrast, market participants in our model
have to incur a discrete inspection or show cost in order to nd if there is a match. As a
result, the role of inventory in our model is dierent from that explored by Johri and Leach,
Shevchenko and others, and it closely interacts with learning and memory. After the rms
shows a rst good to the buyer, it knows whether the other good in its inventory is suitable
or not for the buyer. When a broker nds out the preferences of her clients, she knows from
inspecting a good whether there is a t with any of her clients. Thus in our model, inventory
per se does not automatically result in a cost advantage for intermediaries. It is the combi-
nation of inventory with learning and memory that allows the intermediaries to economize
on show and inspection costs. Since both discrete and ow search costs are important forms
of search frictions, our analysis is complementary to the existing literature which emphasizes
ow and delay costs.
Another branch of the literature focuses on the role of intermediaries in mitigating bilat-
eral contracting problems which arise from the search environment (e.g. Spulber 1996, 2009;
4Bikhchadani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998) provide an excellent survey.
5In a related literature starting with Koyotaki and Wright (1993), monetary theorists have studied the
role of money in facilitating trade in frictional matching models (e.g. Trejos and Wright 1995; Shi 1995).
4Diamond 1984; Biglaiser 1993; Li 1998; Rust and Hall 2003). Our theory is also related
to but dierent from the department store theory of a rm (e.g. Fischer and Harrington
1996; Fujita and Thisse 2002). Under a department store theory, a rm can minimize search
(travelling) costs for buyers by locating many dierent types of good in one location. In our
setup, the goods do not have to be in a single location. Firms and brokers in our model also
play a more active role, due again to their use of learning and memory, than a department
store.
The paper is organized as follows. We rst present the benchmark case of search without
intermediation. Next, we study the case of intermediation by rms. Finally, we study the
case of intermediation with buyers' brokers, followed by some concluding remarks.
2 Search without intermediaries
Consider a market where buyers search for a durable good or a service provided by sellers.
Each seller has one unit for sale, and each buyer wants to buy at most one unit. The
environment considered here is standard and follows the sequential search literature. We
will primarily focus on the limit solution when the discount rate r goes to zero.
Suppose there are n types of buyers and sellers, with an equal fraction of each type in
the population. Consider a match between a randomly chosen buyer and a randomly chosen
seller. If the buyer's type (preference) matches the type of the good for sale, the value of
the good to the buyer is 1. Otherwise, the good has zero value to the buyer. The use value
of the good to the seller is zero.
Before seeing a good, both the buyer and the seller do not know whether the buyer's
preference matches the type of the good. They can nd out the value of the match by
inspectiing the good. Every time a buyer inspects a good, the seller has to pay a show
cost cs and the buyer has to pay an inspection cost cb. These discrete costs are incurred
only if a buyer agrees to inspect a good, which is dierent from the standard sequential
search formulation that emphasizes ow costs when participants search. We use discrete
costs per inspection to emphasize that if an intermediary wants to show multiple goods to
a buyer, it has to pay multiple show costs and the buyer will also incur multiple inspection
costs. In contrast, a ow cost specication will build in automatic economies of scale for an
intermediary, which will obscure the issue considered here.
5New buyers and new sellers, drawn uniformly from the n types, arrive at the market
sequentially. Once they arrive at the market, they search for trading partners. When a seller
meets with a buyer, if the seller has the type of good that the buyer wants to buy and they
are able to negotiate a sale, both parties will leave the market permanently. We consider
only steady states where the stocks of buyers and sellers do not vary over time. Let B be the
stock of buyers and S the stock of sellers in the market. In each instant, M (B;S) buyers will
match with the same number of sellers. The matching function, M (B;S), is increasing in
both arguments and has constant return to scale. Let  = B=S denote the market tightness.















The length of a period is 4 and both parties discount the future with common discount
rate r. Then when 4 is small, a buyer gets matched with a seller with probability m()4=,
and a seller gets matched with a buyer with probability m()4.
The continuation payo U for a buyer being unmatched at the end of period 4; when 4


























In the above, cb is incurred upon meeting a seller and t is the transaction price. The sale
occurs only if the inspection shows that there is a match. Otherwise, the buyer returns to
the market. The continuation payo V for a seller being unmatched at the end of period 4;






















In the above, cs is incurred upon meeting a buyer. The sale occurs only if the inspection
shows that there is a match. Otherwise, the seller returns to the market.
We assume that the transaction price t is determined by Nash bargaining with equal
bargaining power. Moreover, to avoid the hold-up problem and a non-existence of equilib-


























(1 + V   U + ncs   ncb): (3)
We complete the model by imposing a free entry condition for producers. Let K be the
cost to a producer of producing a good. Then free entry of producers implies V = K. In
order for the market to exist, we assume throughout of the paper that
1   ncb   ncs > K: (4)
Denition 1 A steady-state search equilibrium without intermediary is dened by the stocks
of market participants (B;S), continuation payos (U;V ); and market price t such that
(a) steady-state conditions (1) and (2) hold;
(b) price t is determined by (3);
(c) free entry (market clearing) condition V = K holds;
(d) buyers participate: U  0:
















(t   V )

:
Substituting t into the functional equations, we can solve U and V as
U =
m()
m() + m() + 2nr
(1   ncb   ncs);
V =
m()
m() + m() + 2nr
(1   ncb   ncs):








(1   ncb   ncs): (6)
6Both the hold-up problem in this class of models (see Spulber 2009) and the non-existence problem of
the equilibrium with trade as r approaches zero are well known (e.g. Camera 2001). Dealing with these
problems detracts from our concern here.
7It is easy to see that U  0 whenever condition (4) holds.
The ex-ante social welfare for buyers and sellers are:
U + V = 1   ncb   ncs: (7)
Notice that when r ! 0 there is no time cost. Thus, the above result is expected since the
expected number of inspections before a successful match is n. Furthermore, the net social
surplus is shared according to market tightness : the seller gets a larger share if the market
condition is more favorable to the seller (i.e. a higher ). The market tightness  is recovered
from equation (6) and the free entry condition V = K.
3 Search with rms
Again suppose there are n types of goods and buyers with equal proportion. We add rms
which buy goods from sellers and sell them to buyers. There are two physically distinct
markets where trade occurs. In the sellers' market, rms buy goods from sellers. In the
buyers' market, rms sell goods to buyers. Buyers, sellers and rms can visit either market
at any time. Each participant can visit only one market at a time. We say a rm completes
a \transaction" when it successfully buys a good from a seller in the sellers' market and then
successfully sells to a buyer in the buyers' market.
Assume that a rm can carry at most two goods in its inventory. We assume for now
that a rm wants to have two dierent types of goods in its inventory before going to the
buyers' market. Upon selling one good, it will return to the sellers' market to obtain a good
which is dierent from the type which is remaining in its inventory. After it buys another
good such that it again has two dierent types of goods in its inventory, the rm will return
to the buyers' market and so on.
We also assume for now that (i) buyers and sellers will not trade directly, (ii) sellers will
not pretend to be rms with two goods, and (iii) buyers will not pretend to be rms with
one good. At the end of this section, we will specify conditions under which, in the search
equilibrium with rms, the incentive conditions (i)-(iii) for buyers and sellers hold and rms
indeed will not go to the buyers' market unless they have two dierent types of goods in
their inventory.
83.1 Matching process
We use the following notation. As before,  denes the market tightness of the overall market
 = B=S: Now we have two separate submarkets. Let Fs denote the number of rms with
one good, and Fb denote the number of rms with two goods. Dene s the market tightness
of the sellers' market where rms pick up goods: s = Fs=S: Similarly, dene b the market
tightness of the buyers' market where rms sell goods to buyers: b = B=Fb:
We assume that the matching technology between rms and sellers (or buyers) is the
same as the one in the market without intermediary. In the sellers' market, the arrival rate
of a match for a seller is given by m(s)  M (Fs;S)=S = M (s;1); and the arrival rate of
a match for a rm is M (Fs;S)=Fs = m(s)=s: Similarly, in the buyers' market, the arrival
rate of a match for a rm is m(b); and the arrival rate of a match for a buyer is m(b)=b:
To simplify notation, in what follows we write ms = m(s) and mb = m(b).
3.2 Equilibrium payos and welfare
We derive the continuation value for a seller, a rm with one good, a rm with two goods,
and a buyer. Since rms in the sellers' market already have one good in inventory, a seller
who meets a rm will be able to sell her good to the rm with probability n 1
n because the
rm wants to buy a dierent type of good compared to what it already owns. As before, let






















where ts is the price paid by the rm to the seller.
A rm with two goods enters the buyers' market, meets with a buyer and shows one of
its good. We assume that the rm learns the exact type of the buyer after inspection. If
there is a match between the buyer and the rst good, the buyer and the seller will negotiate
a price and consummate the trade. If the initial inspection results in a mismatch, the rm
has to decide whether it wants to show the second good in its inventory to the buyer. The
rm has to incur another show cost if it has to show the buyer the second good. Similarly,
the buyer will have to pay another inspection cost if he wants to see the second good. If the
rm does not show the second good, both parties separate and go on their own ways.
Because the rm learns the exact type of the buyer from the rst inspection, it will not
9show the second good to the buyer unless it knows that the second good is a match with the
buyer's type. A more realistic assumption is that the rm gradually narrows down the set
of the buyer's possible types after the rst several goods were rejected. In section 5, we will
briey discuss the robustness of our results to alternative learning technologies.
Let W1, W2 denote the continuation payo of a rm with a good and a rm with two


















































where tb is the price the buyer pays to the rm. In W2, one show cost is incurred upon
meeting a buyer when the buyer sees the rst good. The second show cost is incurred only
if there is a match with the buyer with the second good in the rm's inventory.






























Similarly, one inspection cost is incurred upon meeting a rm when the buyer sees the rst
good. The second inspection cost is incurred only if there is a match with the rm with the
second good in the the rm's inventory.

































Similarly, Nash bargaining before inspection also help set the price tb between a buyer and






































1 + W2   W1   U +
1
2
(n + 1)(cs   cb)

: (13)
10In the steady state, the number of rms picking up goods successfully must be equal to










Finally, we impose free entry conditions to complete the model. First, with free entry
of producers, sellers must get the same reservation utility as producers, that is, V = K.
Second, since a rm with one good can always choose to be a seller, and a seller with one
good can choose to be a rm, we can write the free entry conditions as:
W1 = V = K: (15)
Denition 2 A steady-state search equilibrium with rms is dened by the stocks of market
participants (B;S;Fb;Fs), continuation payos (U;W1;W2;V ); and market prices (tb;ts)
such that
(a) steady-state conditions (8), (9), (10), (11) and (14) hold;
(b) prices (tb;ts) are determined by (12) and (13);
(c) free entry (market clearing) condition (15) holds;
(d) buyers and rms participate: U;W1;W2  0:
(e) the following incentive conditions hold: (i) buyers and sellers do not directly trade,
(ii) rms do not carry two identical goods, and (iii) rms with one good, rms with two
goods, buyers and sellers will not pretend to be one another.
By inserting the transaction prices ts and tb into the four functional equations, we can













































The rst two equations imply V = sW1; while the last two equations give us U = W2=b:
11Substituting V = sW1 and U = W2=b into equation (17) and (18), we derive the




2 (cs + cb)

b   n
n 1 (b + 1)(cs + cb)





2 (cs + cb)

(s + 1)b   n
n 1b (cs + cb)
1 + s + sb
: (21)




2 (cs + cb)

(s + 1)   n
n 1 (cs + cb)





2 (cs + cb)

sb   n
n 1s (b + 1)(cs + cb)
1 + s + sb
: (23)
In the search market with rms, the expected total payo for a pair of seller and buyer
is given by
U + V = 1  
n + 1
2
(cb + cs)  
n
n   1
(cb + cs): (24)
The term n+1
2 (cb + cs) is the expected social cost of completing a trade in the sellers' market,
and n
n 1 (cb + cs) is the expected social cost of completing a trade in the buyers' market. So
the above expression means that the buyers and sellers obtain all the surplus from participat-
ing in these markets. Recall that each transaction consists of a purchase and a sale, so rms
earn zero prot from each transaction (see a formal proof of this result in the Appendix).
This zero prot per transaction result is expected because rms are innitely lived. If the
prot per transaction is positive at r = 0, rms will make innite total prots.
By comparing the social welfare with rms and without rms, we obtain the welfare
improvement due to rms:
4(U + V ) =
n2   4n + 1
2(n   1)
(cb + cs): (25)
Therefore, the introduction of rms improves social welfare as long as n  4:
This result is expected. Firms have to incur inspection costs to buy goods. In order
to recover these inspection and show costs, the degree of heterogeneity must be suciently
large such that rms can economize on show and inspection costs of market participants.
Moreover, when n  4 and assumption (4) holds, W2 > W1 and U  0 so that both rms
and buyers will participate.
123.3 Incentive conditions
In order to fully characterize the equilibrium, we need to nd conditions under which the
following incentive conditions hold: (i) buyers and sellers will not trade directly, (ii) sellers
will not directly go to the buyers' market, (iii) buyers will not directly go to the sellers'
market, and (iv) rms will not go to the buyers' market unless they have two dierent types
of goods in their inventory.
Recall that, when n  4; the joint payos of buyers and sellers are higher in dealing with
rms compared to trading directly. By trading directly either the seller or the buyer will be
worse o and thus at least one of the two parties will refuse to trade directly. Therefore,
incentive condition (i) is satised if n  4. It remains to nd conditions for (ii)-(iv).
Seller's incentives
A seller can pretend to be a rm and approach buyers in the buyers' market. If the buyer
rejects the good on oer, the seller can say that the other good in its phantom inventory
does not t the buyer's type either.
When r ! 0, the bid-ask spread is equal to the rm's expected information cost for each
transaction:







When a seller goes to the buyers' market directly by pretending to be a rm, he pockets the


























A buyer can pretend to be a rm with one good and buy directly from a seller at price ts
in the following way. If the good ts the buyer's preference, a buyer pays ts to the seller. If
the good does not t, the buyer tells the seller that the good coincides what he already has.
13When r ! 0, the bid-ask spread is equal to the rm's expected information cost for each
transaction:







When a buyer goes to the sellers' market directly by pretending to be a rm, he saves on






















n2   4n + 1
: (27)
In particular, when cs > cb, the show cost portion of the bid-ask spread, n+1
2 cs, exceeds
the increase in expected inspection cost from going to the sellers' market directly. In this
case, the buyer will not want to deal with rms and his incentive condition is violated.
Firm's incentives
First of all, we need to insure that a rm will not go to the buyers' market with two identical
goods. We focus on the potential gain of the rm from each transaction by deviation. Recall
that a transaction for a rm consists of a successful purchase from a seller and a successful
sale to a buyer. If a rm cannot gain from deviation for one transaction, then it cannot
gain by deviating for more than one transactions. Therefore, although in principle the rm
can deviate for any number of transactions, it is sucient to show that the rm cannot gain
from deviating for one transaction.
Suppose a rm with one good meets a seller and nds out that the seller's good coincides
with the one it already has. If it rejects the seller and continues to search sellers, its expected








The rst term is the inspection cost just incurred, the second term is the expected inspection
cost of picking up a good which is dierent from what it already has, and the third term is
the show cost of selling a good to a buyer.
If instead the rm buys the good from the seller and thus goes to the buyers' market
with two identical goods, its expected cost of completing a transaction is cb + ncs. Given








cs  cb + ncs;




n2   2n + 1
2n
: (28)
It remains to show a rm with one good will not immediately go to the buyers' market
to look for a buyer. That is, when it sells one good, it returns to the sellers' market to pick
up another good. Again, since a rm's deviation cannot aect market prices, we only need
to compare expected cost to complete a transaction. If a rm goes to the buyers' market







If a rm with one good goes to the buyers' market directly, its expected cost to complete a
transaction is ncs + cb. Therefore, a rm with one good will not pretend to be a rm with















It is easy to see that the rm's incentive conditions (28) and (29) are implied by the seller's
incentive condition (26) for all n  2. Therefore, all parties' incentive conditions are satised
if n  4 and
n2   1





n2   4n + 1
2n
: (30)
Notice that the set of cost ratio cb=cs that satises above constraints is non-empty as long
as n  8. Moreover, as n is large, the seller's IC constraint (26) is always satised, while
the buyer's IC constraint is also satised if cb is relatively higher than cs. The following
proposition summarizes the main result of this section.
Proposition 1 A search equilibrium with rms exists and improves social welfare if condi-
tion (30) holds.
154 Search with brokers
In the previous section, rms as intermediaries buy goods from sellers and sell them to
buyers. The discussion following (27) shows that the search equilibrium with rms may not
exist if cs > cb. Can other types of intermediaries exist if cs > cb? This section studies the
role of brokers who represent buyers in their search for goods.
Again suppose there are n types of goods and buyers with equal proportion. New buyers
and sellers, drawn uniformly from the n types, arrive at the market sequentially. Instead of
rms, consider a buyer's broker (henceforth broker) who rst contacts buyers in the buyers'
market. When a broker meets a buyer, the broker incurs a show cost cs, the buyer pays
a inspection cost cb, and the broker nds out the buyer's preference. If they agree on the
commission  and representation, then the broker will represent the buyer in the sellers'
market and receive . Once a broker meets with a seller, the seller pays a show cost cs to
show his good and the broker pays cb to inspect the good. After the broker nds a suitable
good for her client to buy, the buyer will inspect the good and negotiate to buy the good
from the seller. The buyer and seller leave the market permanently after trade. Assume that
a broker can represent at most two buyers.
Similar to the case of rms, we assume for now that (i) buyers and sellers will not trade
directly, (ii) sellers will not pretend to be brokers with one client, (iii) buyers will not pretend
to be brokers with two clients, and (iv) brokers will not go to the sellers' market unless they
have already contracted with two dierent buyers. At the end of this section, we will specify
conditions under which the incentive conditions (i)-(iv) hold.
Our main result in this section is that for n suciently large, an equilibrium with brokers
will exist if cs > cb. Thus there is a natural separation of the parameter space where rms
which buy inventory exist versus where brokers who search on behalf of their clients exist.
4.1 Matching Process
Let As denote the number of brokers with two buyers, and Ab denote the number of brokers
with one buyer. Dene s the market tightness of the sellers' market where brokers try to
nd the right sellers to their clients (buyers): s = As=S: Similarly, dene b the market
tightness of the buyers' market where brokers nd buyers: b = B=Ab:
We assume that the matching technology between brokers and sellers (or buyers) is the
16same as the one in markets without intermediary. Therefore, with abuse of notation, in the
sellers' market, we denote the arrival rate of a match for a seller by m(s)  M (s;1); and
the arrival rate of a match for a broker by m(s)=s. Similarly, in the buyers' market, the
arrival rate of a match for a broker is m(b) and the arrival rate of a match for a buyer is
m(b)=b.
Similar to the case of rms, in the steady state, the number of brokers picking up buyers











As before, in what follows we write ms = m(s) and mb = m(b) to simplify notation.
4.2 Continuation Payos and Welfare
Let U be the continuation value of a buyer without an broker at the end of period 4, Ua be
the continuation value of a buyer contracted with a broker who has another client, and Ub
be the continuation value of a buyer who has to return to the buyers' market with his broker








































































where  is the commission a buyer has to pay to his broker, and t is the price of the good
charged to a buyer. Notice that when the broker nds an appropriate good for one of her
two buyers, this buyer still has to inspect the good in order to verify that his preference
matches the type of the good. That is why there is a cb in the equation of Ua.
With abuse of notation, let W1 and W2 be the continuation value of a broker with one



































































Notice that, after the broker nds out the seller's good is a good match with one of broker's
clients (with probability 2=n), the seller still needs to incur one more show cost cs when
showing it to the client.





















The transaction price t between a seller and a buyer is determined by Nash bargaining before






















To complete the model, we impose the stationary condition (31) and free entry condition
for sellers and brokers. The seller's free entry condition is the same as before: V = K. For
the brokers, let L denote the broker's outside option. The broker without a client can go to
the buyers' market to pick up a buyer by incurring cost cs. But the continuation value for a
broker with one client is W1. Therefore, when r ! 0, we can write the free entry condition
for the broker as: W1 = L+cs  : Then the search equilibrium with brokers can be dened
analogously to the one with rms.




























W1 = bU (34)




Therefore, the total social welfare is
U + V = 1  
n + 2
2




18Again the broker's expected prot per transaction is zero (see Appendix for a formal proof).
Social welfare with brokers minus the social welfare without intermediary is
4(U + V ) =
n2   5n + 2
2(n   1)
(cb + cb);
which is positive for n  5.
4.3 Incentive conditions
As in the case of rms, we need to check incentive compatibility conditions for sellers, buyers
and brokers. Notice that when n  5 the joint payos of buyers and sellers are higher in
dealing with brokers compared to trading directly. Therefore, either the seller or the buyer
will be worse o by trading directly. Therefore, we only need to worry about incentive
conditions (ii)-(iv).
Seller's incentives
The seller can pretend to be a broker with one client and approach buyers directly. Once he
meets a buyer, he incurs cost cs to nd out the type of the buyer. If the buyer's preference
matches the seller's good, the seller will incur another show cost cs to show his good to the
buyer and collect both commission  and price t.7 If the buyer does not match the seller's
good, the seller can claim that the buyer's type coincides with the type of client whom he
has already contracted with.








If the seller goes to the buyers' market directly, he saves commission  but incurs more show






because the seller on average meets n=2 brokers in order to make a sale and in case of a
match the seller has to incur another show cost to show the nal buyer. If the seller goes
to the buyers' market directly, his expected show cost is (n + 1)cs, because the seller on
average meets n buyers in order to make a sale and in case of a sale the seller need to show
7Notice that after nding out that there is a match the buyer is happy to accept the seller's oer even
though the buyer knows that the seller is not a broker.



















In particular, if cb > cs, the above condition cannot hold and the equilibrium with brokers
does not exist.
Buyer's incentives
A buyer can pretend to be a broker with two buyers and buy a good directly from a seller
at price t. If the good ts the buyer's preference, such a buyer pays t to the seller. If the
good does not t, the buyer tells the seller that the other buyer he represents does not like
the good either.
If the buyer pretends to be a broker and goes to the sellers' market directly, he can pocket
commission  but has to incur more inspection cost in expectation. If he trades through





cb, because on average the buyer needs to
contact n=(n   1) brokers and in case of a match he need to do a nal inspection. If he goes
to the sellers' market directly, his expected inspection cost is ncb since on average he needs
to contact n sellers in order to nd the right good. Therefore, a buyer will not pretend to



















n2   5n + 2
: (37)
Broker's incentives
For the broker's incentives, we rst nd conditions under which a broker will not serve two
buyers with the same preference. Suppose the broker with a buyer meets another buyer and
nds out that this buyer's type coincides with the one he has already contracted with. If








20If the broker deviates and accepts the buyer, then her total expected cost to complete a








cb  cs + ncb;







Second, we also need to insure that a broker with one good will not immediately go to
the sellers' market to look for a seller. If the broker goes to the seller's market only if she has
two dierent buyers, the total cost to the broker of completing a transaction is n
n 1cs + n
2cb:
But if the broker with one buyer goes to the seller's market directly, the total expected cost
to the broker of completing a transaction is cs+ncb. Therefore, a broker with one buyer will






cb  cs + ncb;








Notice that the broker's incentive conditions (38) and (39) are implied by the seller's incentive
condition (37) for all n  2. Therefore, all parties' incentive conditions are satised if n  5
and
2n








The set of cost ratio cb=cs that satises above constraints is non-empty as long as n  8.
When n is large, the buyer's IC constraint (the rst inequality) in (40) is always satised,
while the buyer's IC constraint is also satised if cb is relatively higher than cs. To summarize
our analysis with brokers, we have
Proposition 2 A search equilibrium with brokers exists and improves social welfare if con-
dition (40) holds.
214.5 Firms vs. brokers
Our analysis demonstrates that the parameter space for rms to exist and for brokers to exist
is naturally separated. In particular, search equilibrium with rms exist when inspection cost
cb is higher than show cost cs, and search equilibrium with brokers exist when cb < cs.
To understand the underlying rationale for this separation, let us compare the bid-ask
spread with rms and the commission with brokers:














In the search equilibrium with rms, when n is large, the size of bid-ask spread is primarily
determined by the size of show cost cs. In contrast, in the search equilibrium with brokers,
the size of commission is primarily determined by the size of inspection cost cb. The main
constraint for the existence of rms or brokers is that either buyers or sellers may not want to
deal with intermediaries if the bid-ask spread or the commission fee is too high. Therefore,
whether rms or brokers will exist depends on which intermediary can operate with a lower
intermediation charges. As a result, intermediation through rms is less prone for deviation
by market participants when cb > cs, whereas intermediation through brokers is less prone
for deviation when cb < cs.
With minimal capacity two, the parameter space for the existence of rms and (buyer)
brokers is disjoint. If intermediaries are allowed to hold three or more inventories, then these
two types of intermediation may coexist (e.g. when cb = cs). In this case, the social welfare
is higher in equilibrium with rms than the one in equilibrium with brokers. The dierence
in welfare is due to the nature of the rst meeting between the buyer and the intermediary.
A rm learns of a buyer's type when the rm shows the buyer its rst good in inventory. If
the good, which is chosen without knowledge of the buyer's type, is a t, the buyer will buy
the good without having to incur additional inspection cost. On the other hand, when a
buyer's broker meets with her client to elicit his preferences, the buyer has to incur a meeting
(inspection) cost without inspecting any good. Thus even if the buyer buys the rst good
which is shown to the buyer by the broker, the buyer has incurred a meeting cost and an
inspection cost.
22Case of sellers' brokers
When cb > cs, there is also a search equilibrium with sellers' brokers who rst search for sellers
to represent and then sell good to buyers on behalf of the sellers. The analysis is similar to
that of buyers' brokers discussed above, and is available upon request. The welfare property
of this equilibrium is similar to the welfare property of the search equilibrium with rms.
Thus our model explains not only when rms or buyers' brokers exist; but also when buyers'
or sellers' brokers exist.
5 Discussion
In order to starkly demonstrate the benets of having inventory or multiple clients, we
only allow intermediaries to hold limited inventory or clients. Endogenizing the size of the
inventory or number of clients is needed. We have ignored the supply of eort by brokers.
Nesting the moral hazard problem with brokers into the model is an important goal for
future research.
We also assume that intermediaries learn perfectly the preference of the buyer after the
rst showing. If the learning technology is not perfect, the parameter space for the existence
of intermediation is smaller. On the other hand, if we allow rms or brokers to hold more
goods or represent more clients, the parameter space for the existence of intermediation is
larger. An important future research question is then to investigate how the inventory size
and the speed of learning jointly determines the possibility of intermediation.
A recent innovation in online retailing is the recommendation systems that online retailers
have developed. For example, the Amazon.com recommendation system recommends a buyer
books which have been purchased by other buyers with similar purchase histories as that
buyer. From the buyer's purchase history, Amazon knows the buyer's preferences. However,
it does not know which books among the thousands that it has t the buyer's preferences.
Amazon.com uses the purchases of the other buyers with similar purchase histories as the
buyer to gure out what other books the buyer will like. Thus Amazon does not have
to a priori categorize books to recommend to buyers. Our current model assumes that
an intermediary can recognize whether a new good it inspects is suitable for a buyer with
known preferences. The Amazon recommendation system shows that such knowledge is not
necessary. Extending our model to deal with this case is another goal for future research.
236 Appendix
This Appendix shows the expected prot per transaction for intermediaries (either rms or
brokers) is zero in the limit equilibrium as r ! 0.
First consider the case of rms. The expected total information cost a rm incurs in
order to successfully complete a transaction is n
n 1cb+ n+1
2 cs: The bid-ask spread for the rm
is









































The last equality follows from (24). Therefore, the price dierence exactly covers the expected
information cost incurred by a rm per successful transaction.
The broker's case is analogous. The expected total cost of making a sale for a broker is
n
n 1cs + n






(cs   cb) +
1
2




































Therefore, a broker's expected prot per transaction is zero.
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